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1 Introduction: What kind of media pluralism?
Media policy rarely stands for a newsworthy topic in media coverage. Recent me-
dia policy developments in Poland, however, attract wide media coverage and the
attention of governmental and non-governmental international and national organi-
sations and bodies. This article aims at putting the debated regulatory changes into
a relevant context through policy analysis. The normative concept against which the
change will be tested, is media pluralism. Why? The concept of media pluralism is
often viewed as an important condition for a well-functioning and democratic public
sphere and media, while also incorporating political, economic and cultural value
dimensions.
Yet, in the area of media policy, the concept of media pluralism ‘suffers’ from
paradoxes. On the one hand, it has been attributed with too broad and loose inter-
pretations (referring simply to numerous, many media). On the other hand, it has
been portrayed as being too complex to be approachable by focused regulatory re-
sponses (Valcke et al. 2015; Napoli 2007). Moreover, an intense reshaping of the
current digital environment led to claims that pluralism is no longer (and shouldn’t
be) a policy issue, due to the development of digital technological infrastructures,
which solve the problems of content and distribution. While we might agree with
the critics of this view of questioning technological neutrality, due to the structural
conditioning of the communication environment, there is also another important di-
mension – normativity of media pluralism – that might be taken into account when
defending the usefulness of this concept in media policies. In other words, a nor-
mative rationale for a policy action employs understanding of media pluralism as
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a desirable and thus, not any condition. Media pluralism functions as a value-ridden
term, suggesting the arrangement of media system policy that is intended.
The idea of media pluralism historically underpinned a fundamental media policy
reform after the collapse of communism in Poland. The term referred to pluralism as
a corrective response to previous exclusion of viewpoints, ideas, cultural represen-
tations and images from the public sphere. Thus policy ideals focused on opening-
up and inclusiveness of the media environment, suggesting that the media landscape
needed a wide range of media outlets, and services reflecting various points of view,
while recognising diverse social and cultural representations and definitions of so-
cial reality. In this sense, media pluralism seemed to be conditionally linked to the
public sphere, where, as Hannah Arendt observed, there is “simultaneous presence
of innumerable perspectives and aspects in which the common world presents it-
self” and “everything can be seen and heard by everybody” (Arendt 1958, p. 57).
Such a potential inclusiveness of the public sphere is not given for granted. Jür-
gen Habermas sees several institutional arrangements as indispensable standards:
“a separation of a (tax-based) state from a (market-based) society, communication
and association rights and a regulation of the power structure of the public sphere
securing the diversity of independent media, and a general access of inclusive mass
audiences to the public sphere” (Habermas 2006, p. 412). Robert A. Dahl enumer-
ates “alternative information” as one of seven essential institutional arrangements
necessary for democracy (Dahl 1979, p. 223). “Alternative information” is referred
to as a citizens’ communicative right (“citizens have a right to seek out alternative
sources of information”), empirical condition (“alternative sources of information
exist”) and legal obligation (“alternative sources of information are protected by
law”) (Dahl 1979, p. 223). In other words, “alternative sources of information”
would largely, although not exclusively, correspond with the pluralistic mass media
that should exist in a democratic system in order to facilitate the use of communica-
tion rights and be protected by law. Such diversity may manifest in different forms
within the media environment, where scholars and policy-makers refer to ‘external’
and ‘internal’ diversity (McQuail 1992; MM-CM 1994; Voltmer 2013). ‘External’
pluralism stands for diversity located outside a particular media entity (and thus
may be generated through various media outlets, each expressing a different point
of view), while ‘internal’ is seen to reside inside the media organization or unit, and
basically reflects differentiation of contents and services offered (including diver-
sity of values, interests, representations and views expressed). External diversity is
associated with diversity of ownership, as well as ideological, political or cultural
divisions of a particular segment of the media environment, often resulting in po-
litical parallelism (Hallin and Mancini 2004). On the other hand, internal diversity
is most frequently linked to the ideal purpose of the public service media (PSM),
meaning that no particular groups and views are excluded, and no groups and views
can expect a particularly favourable treatment either (Voltmer 2013).
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2 A historical background
All in all, the idea of media pluralism, as one of the basic components of a demo-
cratically functioning public sphere, served to justify a general trajectory for the
media policy reform after 1989 in Poland. An overall direction of this trajectory
aimed at removing the influence of the state, which manifested itself in 1990 with
the elimination of institutionalised censorship and replacing it with licensing of the
press and with registration by the courts. What followed then was formalized pri-
vatization, implemented by state administration according to the specific law. The
policy design for privatization and the opening of the press market was guided by
the idea of deregulation. The 1984 Press Law1, although amended several times up
until recently, has not properly addressed questions of media pluralism, ownership,
concentration and general structure of the media or press market in Poland. Thus
only general competition rules regulated the mergers and acquisitions that quickly
followed the initial proliferation of the press. The main direction of the broadcast-
ing sector, which also has a general approach to media policy, was set in 1992,
with an enforcement of the 1992 Broadcasting Act2, following the establishment of
a broadcasting regulator – the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT – Krajowa
Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji). Article 213 of the 1997 Polish Constitution3 set the
KRRiT’s role as safeguarding freedom of speech, the right to information as well as
safeguarding public interest regarding radio and television broadcasting. The 1992
Broadcasting Act exposed more explicitly the need to cater for a pluralistic media
landscape as seen in Article 6 (1):
“The National Council shall safeguard freedom of speech in radio and television
broadcasting, protect the independence of broadcasters and the interests of the public,
as well as ensure the open and pluralistic nature of radio and television broadcasting.”
Yet, in the regulatory and decision-making practice, this general goal of safe-
guarding the pluralistic nature of radio and television broadcasting has been limited
by a closed list of the regulator’s power, including, among other things, the licence-
granting procedures, supervising activities and programme requirements of public
service media, monitoring broadcasting market and content obligations, expressing
opinions that contribute to the development of media policy with no other power
than the withdrawal of licences to influence market concentration and ownership
changes.4
These media-policy contours concerning distinctive treatment of the press and
broadcasting have endured since then, with minor or more fundamental changes in-
troduced by subsequent governments. The role of the government has been principal
1 The 1984 Press Law Act (Ustawa Prawo Prasowe) adopted on 26 January, 1984, Official Journal 1984
No 5, item 24, as amended. .http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19840050024
2 The 1992 Broadcasting Act (Ustawa o Radiofonii i Telewizji) adopted on 29 December
1992, as amended, Official Journal 1993, No 7, item 34, http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?
id=WDU19930070034, unofficial translation: .http://www.krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/Portals/0/
angielska/Documents/Regulations/broadcasting_act_28022013.pdf
3 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Konstytucja RP), adopted on 2 April 1997, Official Journal
1997, No 78, item 483, .http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm
4 Article 6 (3), 1992 Broadcasting Act.
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in initiating policy changes, mainly through the Ministry of Culture and National
Heritage. Yet, the role of the National Broadcasting Council has also been impor-
tant, in particular due to its legal mandate to issue regulations – often specifying in
greater detail, the measures set in legal acts. As a result of the policy and regula-
tory frameworks, the structural outcome of the Polish media landscape has evolved
towards the presence of private media groups (both domestic and foreign), public
service media and media owned by social, educational or religious institutions (e. g.,
religious media, university radio networks, minority media), among which Catholic
media in particular maintained a relatively strong position. It is worth to add in
this context, that some Catholic broadcasters have made use of a possibility to be
recognized as “social broadcasters” under the 1992 Broadcasting Act and are thus
eligible for being awarded licences under special conditions (free of charge)5.
The victory of Law and Justice Party in the parliamentary election in October
2015 was marked by a historical precedent. For the first time since 1989, a single
party has formed a majority government, while the President also shares the same
political background. Shortly after its formation, the government proposed a set of
25 main reforms in various fields of social and economic life including family policy,
public finance, national security, justice, media, under the motto of “good change”
(dobra zmiana). To what extent the changes in media policy present a departure
from the previous trajectory? The following parts of the article will elaborate on
two aspects of media pluralism: internal – examining changing conditions for PSM
and its position within the overall media system, and external – reflecting on the
question of ownership, announced “repolonisation” of the media and a possible role
of the state in changing structural conditions of the media environment.
3 From state to public and from public to national media: The first step
From the institutional perspective, public service media may be seen as a useful
contribution to functional diversity within the media landscape: financed by the
public with no commercial sources such as advertising, they are not forced to focus
principally on the content that would best sell. Instead, they could develop services
with complementary functions, such as high quality cultural programmes or more
expensive news genres, which were often omitted based on economic grounds. Thus,
the general condition of PSM, their strength, professional autonomy, performance
quality, political independence and financial stability indicate to what extent PSM
generally contribute to internal media pluralism.
PSM in Poland were created more than 25 years ago as a part of the far-reach-
ing media reform removing the principal influence of the state. In this process, the
former state media have been re-defined and legally recognized as public service
media. Yet, a normative ‘Western’ model as a point of departure, was implemented
only partially. Although legal norms granted professional autonomy to a certain ex-
tent, political control remained strong (mainly over appointments in management
structures). Until the beginning of 2016, the Board of Management was appointed
5 Article 39b, 1992 Broadcasting Act.
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by the National Broadcasting Council. This procedure was not free from politi-
cal influences. In practice, the process of board selection was, quite often, guided
by political interests, due to the direct dependency relations between the National
Broadcasting Council and the bodies that nominated its members – Sejm, Senate and
the President. The political culture in Poland repeatedly proved that there is a big
appetite for political control of both the KRRiT and PSM’s Supervisory as well as
Management Boards. With every change in the Parliamentary composition, the com-
position of the National Broadcasting Council also changed, and subsequently the
composition of PSM Management Boards and Supervisory Councils (see: Jakubow-
icz 2004; Ociepka 2003; INDIREG 2011). Moreover, the architects of the Polish
PSM model never succeeded in providing its full funding from public sources –
license fees. During the last 25 years, license fee revenue of the Polish Television
(TVP) has oscillated between 30–17%. In 2015, 404 mio. of PLN were collected
from the licence fees, which comprised only 29% the overall cost for the realisation
of public service Polish Television – 1383 mio. of PLN. In 2013, 282.4 mio. of
PLN were collected from licence fees, which comprised 21% of the overall costs
of production of public service – 1363 mio. of PLN. Thus, most of TVP’s activities
were financed from advertising, sponsoring and other commercially related sources.6
Paradoxically, problems with independent financing, have not strongly affected the
position of PSM, and television in particular in audience markets. For this reason,
politicians remain highly interested in maintaining some form of control over PSM
and a constant ‘PSM reform’ has remained high in political agendas and programmes
of the subsequent governments.
Not surprisingly, the Law and Justice government announced its willingness to
improve conditions of PSM under the “good change” shortly after its formation in
the fall 2015. The arguments of both government officials and President emphasised
the necessity to improve impartiality, the national character of PSM and a greater
exposure of patriotic values. On 30 December 2015, Polish Sejm enacted the so
called “Small Media Act” (Mała Ustawa Medialna) amending the current 1992
Broadcasting Act. The 2015 Act was passed with great speed after the signature
by the President and publication of the Act on 7 January 2016 and presented the
first step towards an announced “Big Media Act” being prepared by the Ministry of
Culture and National Heritage. Elżbieta Kruk, one of the Law and Justice MPs and
the Chief of the Sejm Committee of Culture, backing the Act in the parliamentary
debate, explained:
“The PSM ignore their mission towards the national community. They promote
ideological and moral fashions that are not accepted by a societal majority. The
journalists, instead of creating media exposure to Polish raison d’etre, often
6 See: KRRiT (2016) 2015 Annual Report (Sprawozdanie 2015), (http://www.krrit.gov.pl/krrit/
sprawozdania/); KRRiT (2016) Informacja o podstawowych problemach radiofonii i telewizji w 2015
roku (Information about basic issues concerning radio and television in 2015) (http://www.krrit.gov.pl/
Data/Files/_public/Portals/0/komunikaty/spr-info-krrit-2015/informacja-o-podstawowych-problemach-
radiofonii-i-telewizji-w-2015-roku.pdf; retrieved 17 January 2017).
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sympathise with unfavorable opinions regarding Poland. For the good of the
national community, this should be changed as soon as possible.”7
The link to “the good of the national community” and “unheard and silent major-
ity” set a basic rhetoric line of the political argument defending a profound change
of PSM in order to support and rebuild its “national” character. The nationalism
argument is not new in media policies over the past two decades in Poland, albeit
no previous government or parliamentary majority forced it with such enthusiasm.
Against the rich discursive background, the content of the 2015 Small Media Act
was fairly minimalistic: dealing solely with the PSM appointment procedure, while
avoiding issues of quality of PSM performance or more comprehensively function-
ing of PSM or public funding – which should have been addressed in the first place.
In principle, the Act contained only 4 Articles that introduced the following changes
in PSM appointment and employment structure:
● Members of the Board of Management, including the President of the Board of
Management and members of the Supervisory Board will by appointed by the
Minister of the Treasury (Article 1)
● All terms shall be shortened and mandates shall expire for the current members
of the Management and Supervisory Boards of PSM with the passing of this act
(Article 2)8
This form of appointment – although temporary (the 2015 Act expired on 30 June
2016) – created direct dependency between the government (Minister of Treasury)
and PSM resulting in the extended power of political control into the PSM’s employ-
ment structure. Telewizja Polska (TVP) and Polskie Radio (PR) witnessed massive
layoffs of members in management and supervisory boards, but also a large number
of journalists were laid off, some after 20 years of work in the public service.
4 Reactions of European organisations
The enforcement of the law induced strong reactions from international institutions
and the European Union at the beginning of January 2016. In his letter to the Polish
President Andrzej Duda, Thorbjørn Jagland, the Secretary General of the Council
of Europe expressed particular concern about the new law “and the impact it may
have on the integrity and independence of public service media, as a vital condition
7 TVP.info (2015) Sejm przyjął ustawę o mediach publicznych (Sejm passed the Act on Public Ser-
vice Media) .http://www.tvp.info/23383140/sejm-przyjal-ustawe-o-mediach-publicznych-poslowie-pis-
skanduja-wolne-media
8 The 2015 Act Changing the Broadcasting Act, so called “Small Media Act” (Ustawa o zmianie ustawy
o radiofonii i telewizji, tzw. “Mała Ustawa Medialna”) adopted on 30 December 2015 and expired on
30 June 2016, Official Journal 2016, item 25. http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20160000025.
See the English translation of the document: http://www.krrit.gov.pl/en/for-broadcasters-and-operators/
legal-regulations/; retrieved 12 January 2017.
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for genuine democracy”9. Dunja Miljatovic, OSCE Representative on Freedom of
the Media warned that the controversial act gives the government “direct control
over management positions in the PSB.”10 The European Commission took an un-
precedented move to launch an investigation into the rule of law in Poland. Frans
Timmermans, First Vice-President of the European Commission, addressing two
Polish ministers (of Foreign Affairs and Justice), referred explicitly to freedom and
pluralism of the media as one of the common values on which the Union is founded,
adding that “Protocol 29 to the Treaties equally recognizes that the system of public
broadcasting in the Member States is directly related to the democratic, social and
cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve media pluralism.”11
Such strong and immediate reactions from international governmental organisa-
tions might have surprised proponents of the public media reform in Poland. All in
all, PSM has experienced crises in many EU countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal),
and the state administration has been involved in PSM appointment procedures in
mature democracies (in 2008, the President of France took on the duty of appointing
the presidents of French public broadcasters, who were previously nominated by the
CSA, the French media regulator). No similar wave of criticism in scale and le-
gal consequences has, however, been raised previously, perhaps with the exception
of the enactment of Hungarian media laws in 2010. Most probably, many Polish
government and state officials regarded these reactions as a disproportionate and
undue attempt to interfere in the governance of PSM that were formally owned by
the State. Moreover, PSM under previous managements were criticized for the lack
of impartiality and inclusiveness of a broad spectrum of opinions. In one of his
responses to criticism of European institutions, a spokesman for the Polish Presi-
dent, Marek Magierowski, supported the changes in media law claiming that under
the previous government, PSM were “deeply one-party media.” In his words the
broadcasters had “not a penny’s worth of pluralism,” and “not a single EU commis-
sioner or EU lawmaker expressed any concern over the fact.”12 Certainly, a large
portion of Polish journalists – and probably of society as well – shared his view.
The Polish Journalists Association (SDP, Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich) in
its statement addressed to Thorbjorn Jagland during his visit in Warsaw on April
2016 argued that public service media have not fulfilled their mission for a long
time, and that SDP repeatedly called for the substantial and far-reaching reform of
9 Council of Europe (2016) Poland: Jagland raises media law human rights concerns with President Duda.
(http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2016/01/poland-jagland-raises-media-law-human-rights-concerns-
with-president-duda/; retrieved 12 January 2017).
10 OSCE (2016) OSCE media freedom representative urges Poland’s government to withdraw proposed
changes to the selection of management in public service broadcasters.
(http://www.osce.org/fom/213391; retrieved 16 January 2017).
11 The letter of Frans Timmermans to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Justice, 30 December
2015, (http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:RiR3IB_n4aIJ:g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1.
wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Letter-Timmermans-Poland.pdf+&cd=3&hl=pl&
ct=clnk&gl=pl&client=firefox-b; retrieved 19 January 2017).
12 Radio Free Europe (2016) EU Executive Body to Debate Controversial New Polish Media Law (http://
www.rferl.org/a/eu-debate-new-polish-media-law/27465476.html; retrieved 17 January 2017).
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PSM13. The Monitoring Centre of Free Press (CMWP) published a statement call-
ing for the new leadership of public service media to base any personal changes
on professional criteria, with regard to the fact that in past the political, family
and social relations seemed to be more important in PSM employment strategies14.
Yet, other journalistic communities have protested against the law changes and their
consequences. SDRP (The Association of Journalists of the Republic of Poland) in
its statement openly confronted the amendment of 1992 Broadcasting Act, arguing
that the new law brings an end to media pluralism and objective information in
PSM15. Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie (The Journalistic Association) has collected
names of the “victims of the good change”, including a list of journalists who have
been affected by the media reform – either in forms of layoffs, employment contract
changes or removals of job positions. As of January 2017, this list collected 225
such cases.16 These highly polarized evaluations of the journalistic community in
Poland demonstrate cleavages rooted in different ideological perceptions of current
policies – either as necessities or a turn against media freedom and pluralism. They
also reveal deeper societal divides echoing the role of state (strong or weak) and
dimension of national identity (promotion of national and patriotic values against
cosmopolitanism).
An important aspect of the enactment of the “Small Media Act” is the change of
power of the existing media regulator – National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT). In
the opinion of the Polish Human Rights Defender, the Act violated constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and media freedom by subordinating PSM directly
to the government and restricting the constitutional role of the National Broadcasting
Council (KRRiT)17. This opinion was partly backed on 13 December 2016 by the
Constitutional Tribunal (gathered in a smaller group of five judges) in which it held
certain provisions of the legislation to be unconstitutional.18
13 SDP (2016) Stanowisko SDP w sprawie zmian w mediach publicznych zostało przedstawione Sekre-
tarzowi Generalnemu Rady Europy (SDP statement about changes in Public Service Media addressed
to Secretary General of Council of Europe), (http://www.sdp.pl/informacje/12645,stanowisko-sdp-w-
sprawie-zmian-w-mediach-publicznych-zostalo-przedstawione-sekretarzowi-generalnemu-rady-europy,
1459865271; retrieved 17 January 2017).
14 SDP (2016) Apel CMWP SDP w związku ze zmianami personalnymi w mediach publicznych (CMWP
and SDP appeal concerning personal change in Public Service Media), .http://www.sdp.pl/informacje/
12281,apel-cmwp-sdp-w-zwiazku-ze-zmianami-personalnymi-w-mediach-publicznych-,1452855142
15 SDRP (2016) Oświadczenie ZG SDRP w sprawie nowelizacji Ustawy medialnej (SDRP Board state-
ment concerning Media Act amendment), .http://www.dziennikarzerp.pl/2016/01/oswiadczenie-zarzadu-
glownego-stowarzyszenia-dzniennikarzy-rp/
16 Towarzystwo Dziennikarskie (The Journalistic Association) (2017) “Dobra zmiana” w mediach (“Good
change” in the media), (http://towarzystwodziennikarskie.org/; retrieved 19 January, 2017).
17 Human Rights Defender (2016) Commissioner for Human Rights Appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal
on media Law, .https://www.rpo.gov.pl/en/content/commissioner-human-rights-appeal-constitutional-
tribunal-media-law
18 The Constitutional Tribunal judgement No K13/16, on 13 December 2016.
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5 The “Big Media Draft Law”
The 2015 “Small Media Act” presented the first step in the process of a more
profound reform concerning operation of the PSM and transforming “public ser-
vice” into “national” media. On 21 April 2016, the “Big Media Law” package was
submitted to the Polish Parliament. The package consisted of three draft bills, in-
cluding: 2016 Draft Act on National Media, Draft Act on Audiovisual Contribution
and Draft Act on Provisions introducing Act on National Media and Act on Au-
diovisual Contribution.19 The 2016 Draft Act on National Media postulated, among
other things, the following legal changes that were neither part of the previous 1992
Broadcasting Act, nor the 2015 Small Media Act:
● renaming PSM – Polish Television (TV P – Telewizja Polska), PR – Polish
Radio (Polskie Radio) and 17 regional radio stations as the “National Media” and
including the Polish Press Agency (PAP – Polska Agencja Prasowa) (Article 2)
in that group,
● changing the formal status of the national media from a sole-proprietor joint stock
company of the State Treasury to a state legal person (Article 6),
● modifying the overall public service mission of the national media, with a recog-
nition of priorities such as the “cultivation of national tradition, patriotic values
and human values, as well as contributing to the spiritual needs of listeneres and
viewers” (Article 3),
● recognition of editorial autonomy and independence of the national media (Arti-
cle 5),
● modifying specific tasks towards fulfilling the public service mission, including
a priority for “maintaining national community and strengthening responsibility
for the common good”, “enriching historical consciousness and counteracting
misrepresentations of Polish history” (Article 9),
● establishment of a National Media Fund providing financing for the national
media (Article 7),
● appointment of PSM top directors and boards by the Chair of the National Media
Council (Articles 22, 23, 24 and 25),
● establishment of the Social Programme Councils (Articles 29–38),
● establishment of the National Media Council to take over some previous respon-
sibilities of the National Broadcasting Council, performed at that time by the
Minister of State Treasury, in particular the appointment of the executive di-
rectors of the national media and other top directors and boards, and also the
supervision of the operation of the national media and operating the National
Media Fund by the National Media Council (Articles 39–47).
In this form, the 2016 Draft Act on National Media, signaled the stronger con-
nection between the state and PSM. First, this reconnection manifested itself in
a symbolic and discursive level with the redefinition of “public service” as “na-
tional” media. The category of national media incorporated all media organisations
19 See: The Draft Act on National Media (Projekt Ustawy o mediach narodowych) (2016) .http://orka.
sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/dok?OpenAgent&8-020-177-2016
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owned formally by the state under one roof, thus adding to PSM the state-owned
largest news agency in Poland – Polish Press Agency (PAP). In this way, for the
first time since its transformation, PAP has been obliged to fulfill a public service
mission. Given that PAP has been and continues to be the largest provider of news
for other media in Poland, the way in which the public service mission is formulated
in the Draft Act might have influenced editorial news performance and might have
been reflectedt on all other media that use them as a source. The new public service
mission proposed by the Draft Act emphasized “maintaining national community
and strengthening responsibility for the common good” (Article 9.2) and “cultiva-
tion of national tradition, patriotic values and human values” (Article 3.2) among its
priorities. These principles echo the idea of collective imagination of the national
community once described by Benedict Anderson (1991). They proposed the view
of the “national media” as spaces that can potentially contribute to revived collective
imagination of the nation and strengthen the sense of community among its mem-
bers through the focus on national tradition, patriotic values, reinforcing a sense of
belonging to the national community and fostering responsibility for the common
good of that community. The national media were also expected to “enrich historical
consciousness and counteract misrepresentations of Polish history” (Article 9.3). In
the opinion of the Council of Europe’s experts on the three draft Acts regarding
Polish public service media, particularly this last requirement should not be part of
the public service mission as it seems impossible for the national media or regulator
to determine what is or is not “accurate” history.20
Secondly, the stronger connection between the state and the PSM/national media
was manifested in governance and the accountability of the national media. The draft
law introduced a new regulatory body for the national media: National Media Coun-
cil (Rada Mediów Narodowych) with a broad authority including the appointment
of executive directors of the national media and other top directors and boards that
supervise the operation of the national media and operating the National Media Fund
(Articles 39–47). The proponents of the 2016 Draft Act in a legal justification for
the introduction of the new regulatory body claimed that the National Broadcasting
Council (KRRiT) combines in its mandate two contradictory functions: regulating
all actors in the audiovisual market – which requires impartiality and neutrality of
KRRiT towards all such players (regardless of whether they are privately or state
owned) – and supervising state-owned PSM.21 Yet, the National Broadcasting Coun-
cil has combined these two functions (as some other European media regulators did
and do) since 1993 to fulfill its constitutionally defined role in order to safeguard
20 Council of Europe (2016) Opinion of Council of Europe Experts on the three draft Acts regard-
ing Polish public service media, DG (2016)13, Strasbourg, 6 June 2016 (https://www.coe.int/en/
web/media-freedom/news/-/asset_publisher/RuR4jZRX8nrl/content/conclusions-of-an-expert-dialogue-
between-the-polish-government-and-the-council-of-europe?inheritRedirect=false&redirect=https%3A
%2F%2Fwww.coe.int%2Fen%2Fweb%2Fmedia-freedom%2Fnews%3Fp_p_id%3D101_INSTANCE_
RuR4jZRX8nrl%26p_p_lifecycle%3D0%26p_p_state%3Dnormal%26p_p_mode%3Dview%26p_p_col_
id%3Dcolumn-4%26p_p_col_count%3D1;).
21 The Draft Act on National Media (Projekt Ustawy o mediach narodowych) (2016) .http://orka.sejm.
gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/dok?OpenAgent&8-020-177-2016
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freedom of speech, the right to information as well as to safeguard public interest
regarding radio and television broadcasting.22
After numerous consultations, Poland’s deputy minister of culture Krzysztof Cza-
bański decided to postpone the 2016 Big Media Law package. The profound and far-
reaching changes proposed in the package would require undergoing the procedure
of notification of the EU, possibly taking from a few to dozens of months.
6 The National Media Council Act
The June 2016 decision to postpone the Big Media Law package has certainly not
marked political resignation from the project. Instead of a complex set of changes ad-
dressed in one big law package, the government decided to propose another “small”
Act, focusing solely on governance of PSM, mainly due to the fact that the 2015
Small Media Act was due to expire on 30 June 2016. As a result, the new legal Act
was enacted on 22 June 2016 – Act on the National Media Council.23 The Act prin-
cipally deals with the new regulatory body already drafted in the “Big Media Law
Draft Package” – the National Media Council (RMN – Rada Mediów Narodowych).
The Act consists of 25 Articles covering following issues:
● main tasks and power of the National Media Council (Articles 1–2)
● composition and term of office of RMN (Articles 3–4),
● eligibility for membership in RMN (Article 5),
● appointment of RMN members (Article 3 and 6),
● obligations of RMN members (Article 9),
● mandate of the RMN Chairman (Article 10 and 11),
● RMN accountability procedures (Article 13),
● appointment of PSM and PAP executive directors and boards (Article 17 and 18),
● supervision of PSM and PAP by RMN (Article 17 and 18).
Formally, the 2016 Act on the National Media Council amended the 1992 Broad-
casting Act24 and 1997 Act on the Polish Press Agency25, and thus changed a number
of their Articles, concerning appointment, accountability and the supervision of PSM
and PAP.
With the establishment of RMN, the most controversial measure of the 2015
Small Media Act (appointment of members of PSM supervisory and management
boards as well as Directors of the Polish Television and Polish Radio, by the Min-
ister of State Treasury) was not longer in force and the power of PSM directors and
22 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Konstytucja RP), adopted on 2 April 1997, Official Journal
1997, No 78, item 483, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm; Article 213.
23 Act on the National Media Council Ustawa o Radzie Mediów Narodowych, adopted on 22 June 2016,
Official Journal 29 June 2016, item 929, .http://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/du/2016/929/1
24 1992 Broadcasting Act.
25 1997 Act on PAP (Ustawa o Polskiej Agencji Prasowej) adopted on 31 July 1997, Official Jour-
nal 1997, No 107 item 687, as amended .http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/KeyWordServlet?viewName=thasP&
passName=Polska%20Agencja%20Prasowa
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boards appointment was granted to RMN. The new Act provides better safeguards
for balanced powers within the RMN than would be the case in a single member
of government. The members (5) of the National Media Council are appointed by
the Sejm (3) and President (2), who chooses the candidates from proposals of op-
positional parties represented in the Sejm. Still, such a composition of the body
strongly reflects the influence of political parties rather than other social or cultural
groups representing e. g. educational institutions, trade unions, cultural organiza-
tions, journalistic organizations, etc. Moreover, safeguards eliminating a possible
conflict of interests, seem to be rather weak. Membership in the Council excludes
functions and employment in government, local self-government, Chancellery of
the President of the Republic of Poland, membership in the National Broadcasting
Council or holding interests or shares in media companies (Article 5.2. and 5.3.).
Yet, these rules do not limit a possible membership by active politicians and the
Members of Parliament. To compare these conflict-of-interest rules with those for
the membership in the National Broadcasting Council (KRRiT), the RMN measures
offer much weaker protection against political influence. Under the Article 214.2.
of the Polish Constitution, a member of KRRiT cannot belong to a political party,
or a trade union.26 This weakness in the system of governance and supervision has
already manifested itself in the appointment of members to the newly established
National Media Council. On 22 July 2016, the Sejm appointed three members for
the National Media Council, all being Members of the Parliament – Krzysztof Cza-
bański (who acted also as a vice-minister of culture responsible for media reform
and was elected as Chairperson for the National Media Council), Elżbieta Kruk and
Joanna Lichocka (all from Law and Justice Party). Two other members were pro-
posed by the oppositional parties and appointed by the President. In October 2016,
the National Media Council appointed the Executive Director of Polish Television
Jacek Kurski (the same person who was previously nominated by the Minister of
Treasury). The Executive Director of the Polish Radio will be appointed at the end
of February 2017.
These legal and regulatory changes haven’t seemed to soften the critical tone and
concern about media pluralism, particularly from the European Commission. In its
second recommendation, complementing the Commission Recommendation (EU)
2016/1374 regarding the rule of law in Poland, issued on 21 December 2016, the
European Commission largely focusing on the crisis of the Constitutional Tribunal,
refers also to new media legislation that “raises concerns relating to freedom and
pluralism of the media.”27 Katrin Voltmer (2013, p. 149) pays attention to a fragile
process of “tug-of-war” between state and public in new democracies:
“(...) the distinction between public service broadcasting, which serves general
political purposes but keeps at arm’s length from the government of the day,
26 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
27 European Commission (2016) Commission Recommendation of 21 December 2016 regarding the rule
of law in Poland, complementary to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, C (2016) 8950 final,
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4476_en.htm; retrieved 19 January 2017).
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and state television, which is dependent on and serves the interest of the gov-
ernment, is blurred and provides the battleground for endless power struggle
between the ruling elites and broadcasters.”
In the case of new media policy changes in Poland, this battleground has been
deeply conditioned by a societal divide among supporters and critics of “the good
change” of PSM, among proponents of a strong recognition of the national character
of the national media and critics of setting frames and boundaries for collective imag-
ination, among supporters for a closer connection of PSM and state and opponents
demanding a greater distance in the use of power. And thus, internal media pluralism
and the general condition of PSM has become a hostage in re-configuration of the
relations between PSM and state. The question of “what kind of media pluralism?”
is being replaced by the oxymoronic statement “whose media pluralism?”
7 To regulate or not to regulate media ownership: New proposals
Structural and media ownership regulation has been relatively limited in Poland. The
basis for preventing high horizontal concentration in the press market is the general
competition law. The 2007 Act on Competition and Consumer Protection does not
specifically recognize the media sector,28 thus a possible procedure of intervention
is one concerning the abuse of a dominant position in a relevant market. The Article
4.10 defines ‘dominant position’ as “a market position, which allows it to prevent ef-
fective competition in a relevant market (...); it is assumed that an undertaking holds
a dominant position if its market share in the relevant market exceeds 40%.” In addi-
tion, the 2007 Act on Competition and Consumer Protection imposes a requirement
of notification of the intention of concentration. This provision is regulated under
the Article 13.29 As regards the broadcasting market, in addition to competition law,
the relevant body – KRRiT – may use provisions of the 1992 Broadcasting Act for
awarding, refusing or revoking licences in order to prevent a dominant position of
a broadcaster in a given area.30 Current media and competition laws do not contain
specific rules that could promote more competition and at the same time, prevent
a high degree of cross-ownership between the different media. At the same time,
the available data indicate high levels of monomedia concentration in both revenue
and audience markets in Poland. In 2014, the top 4 audiovisual owners altogether
achieved 93% and in 2013, 95% of shares in the revenue market, while the top 4
radio owners 90% in 2014 and in 2013, 78%. Likewise in the audience markets,
the share of the top 4 audiovisual owners stood for 70.2% in 2015 and share of the
28 2007 Act on Competition and Consumer Protection (Ustawa o Ochronie Konkurencji i Konsumentów)
adopted on 16 February 2007, Official Journal, 2007 No 50, item 331, as amended (available at: http://isap.
sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU20070500331; retrieved 15 January 2017).
29 The 2007 Act on Competition and Consumer Protection.
30 1992 Broadcasting Act, Articles 36.2; 38.2.
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top 4 radio owners for 82.2%.31 The share of the four leading press groups in the
overall circulation of the press market reached around 70% in 2013 and 77.5% in
2014.32 Market plurality has been described as one of the areas of highest risk for
media pluralism in Poland in both Media Pluralism Monitor 2015 pilot edition and
the 2016 MPM report.33 The 2016 MPM country report on Poland observes:
“Key problems in this area revolve around a high level of concentration on
both horizontal and cross-media markets, as well as a lack of specific rules
that could, on the one hand, foster more competition and on the other hand,
prevent a high degree of cross-ownership. Legally-grounded as well as self-
regulatory mechanisms providing protection of journalists and editorial content
against commercial and owner influence are, with some exceptions, missing in
Poland. Although transparency of media ownership is guaranteed for the state
agencies, the general public does not enjoy free and full access to the data
about ownership and financial conditions of the media.”34
Media concentration and questions of ownership regulation can hardly be consid-
ered in Poland without the context of ‘foreign’ or transnational ownership. Unlike
the media systems of old European democracies, various segments of the media mar-
ket in Poland (with the exception of the TV sector) are dominated by transnational
foreign companies. In the same vein, like other CEE countries, Poland implemented
relatively permissive regulatory frameworks in the 1990s to attract rather than dis-
courage, foreign investors. Bound by membership in the Council of Europe, EU pre-
accession negotiations and the significant proximity to Western Europe, the Polish
media environment constituted a relatively attractive ground for foreign capital and
innovation in media services (Klimkiewicz 2014). In general, Poland did not im-
pose any limitations on foreign ownership in the sector of the print press, and some
constraints in broadcasting markets have been gradually lifted in order to comply
with the premises of the EU internal market. Yet, political leaders haven’t dared to
address intermittently foreign ownership in the political discourse – as a political
problem – over the last two decades. Almost 10 years ago, Jarosław Kaczyński, the
leader of the current governing party, stressed in an interview for the Channel 1 of
the Polish Radio:
“A large portion of the print press in Poland belongs to German publishers.
There is a need to discuss this phenomenon at the European level and limit
such market developments.”35
31 KRRiT (2016) Informacja o podstawowych problemach radiofonii i telewizji w 2015 roku (Infor-
mation about basic issues concerning radio and television in 2015) .http://www.krrit.gov.pl/Data/Files/_
public/Portals/0/komunikaty/spr-info-krrit-2015/informacja-o-podstawowych-problemach-radiofonii-i-
telewizji-w-2015-roku.pdf
32 Izba Wydawców Prasy (Chamber of Press Publishers) Lista tytułów (The List of Press Titles) (available
at: http://www.iwp.pl/lista_tytulow.php?menu=2&IWP_wydawnictwaPage=9; retrieved 15 January 2017).
33 See: (http://monitor.cmpf.eui.eu/; retrieved 19 January 2017).
34 See: (http://cmpf.eui.eu/News/All/1601MPM2016Grant.aspx; retrieved on 19 January, 2017).
35 An interview held in the first channel of the Polish public radio – PR I, in the programme Sygnały dnia
(The Signals of the Day), 30.01.2007.
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The idea to intervene in the structural composition of the media market by the
current Law and Justice government goes back to the development of general eco-
nomic policy of “repolonisation”, promoted as a trend aiming at re-establishment
of a balance between foreign and domestic capital and strengthening the position
of state-owned companies in order to make them more competitive in the EU and
global markets. The concept of repolonisation has been reflected in one of PM Beata
Szydlo’s speeches in these words: “We need to rebuild Polish industry, regain the
banking sector and the media. We need Polish production.”36
One of the first moves signaling a possible regulatory change in the question of
media ownership was a special meeting of the Sejm Committee on Culture orga-
nized on 30 November 2016. Jarosław Sellin, the vice minister of culture attending
the meeting, claimed that discussions about the economy over the last 20 years
were dominated by the belief that capital has no nationality. Yet, in the words of
vice-minister Sellin, it has nationality, particularly in such a sensitive market like
the media.37 In the debate, several issues were addressed, such as the possibility of
introducing 20–25% threshold for market concentration, the intention of acquiring
media by state companies and the spectacular acquisition of a number of regional
dailies from Mecom by Verlagsgruppe Passau (in Poland operating as Polskapresse)
that led almost to a monopole structure of the regional daily newspaper market.
The acquisition was formally approved in 2013 by the Office for Competition and
Consumer Protection, while some MPs, during the Committee on Culture meeting,
claimed that the case should be reopened and investigated again. At the beginning
of 2017, a new team was formed gathering experts from the Ministry of Culture
and National Heritage, Office of Competition and Consumer Protection and Na-
tional Broadcasting Council. Their role will be to draft new regulations, possibly
introducing media-specific rules preventing ownership concentration. The minister
of culture Piotr Gliński stated that the new regulations should ensure broad media
pluralism in Poland. At the same time, he assured that the rules will not tackle
previous ownership changes, including mergers and takeovers, and can only address
future structures.38
Media-specific anti-concentration measures are certainly missing in Poland. Yet
equally important are mechanisms providing protection for journalists and edito-
rial content against commercial and owner influence, as well as making the media
ownership and financing transparent and easily available to the public. In the era of
a declining role of the press, these rules and transparency measures should take into
account cross-media ownership and financing from advertising.
36 EU Observer (2016) Poland seeks to boost state control of economy (https://euobserver.com/beyond-
brussels/132421; retrieved 20 January 2017).
37 WP money (2016) Repolonizacja mediów. PIS szykuje przepisy na zagranicznych wydawców
(Repolonisation of the media. PIS prepares regulations for foreign publishers) (http://www.money.pl/
gospodarka/wiadomosci/artykul/repolonizacja-mediow-nowe-pomysly-pis,85,0,2210389.html; retrieved
19 January 2017).
38 PAP (2016) Gliński: będą nowe regulacje dotyczące rynku mediów w Polsce, 30 December 2016
(http://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,756057,glinski-beda-nowe-regulacje-dotyczace-rynku-mediow-w-
polsce.html; retrieved 20 January 2017).
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8 Conclusions
Media pluralism resembles a fragile garden. It grows and develops in an enabling
environment. In harsh conditions, only the strongest species survive. The role of the
state should be to foster an enabling environment and conditions for media to grow
and develop. Such conditions would allow more vulnerable media, such as local,
regional, special-interest, minority or community to operate side-by-side with large
media groups without the threat of possible extinction or takeover. PSM should enjoy
a stable position in the media system, supported by strong editorial independence and
autonomy as well as sufficient long-term financing for as long as the public supports
the values that PSM generate for society. Reflecting on possible consequences of the
current media reform in Poland, so far focusing on PSM, the policy action seemed to
start from the wrong end – tackling the issue of appointment procedure first instead
of ensuring essentials such as legal guarantees of PSM editorial independence and
autonomy, and a stable and long-term mode of PSM financing. Combined with the
symbolic renaming of the PSM as “national media”, and a proposal to rearrange
the public service mission in order to promote national tradition, patriotic values
and strengthen a sense of belonging to the national community, both the current
and drafted legal changes signal a stronger connection between the state and PSM.
Instead of strengthening the public accountability of PSM, PSM are being made
accountable to the new regulatory body nominated by state institutions (the Sejm
and President) and representing the political, rather than social and professional en-
vironments. Despite international criticism and strong political reactions, the Polish
government position is cemented around PSM governance by the state, legitimated
by a support of the significant part of the divided society and journalistic community.
The state shouldn’t be weak when creating an enabling media environment. It should
be strong enough to ground its policy on public legitimacy that does not deepen, but
attempts to bridge societal and professional divides. After all, media policy is not
about establishing contours of new power relations, but balancing various interests
in which the interests and needs of media users come first.
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(Whose television? The public service model in post-communist Central Europe). Wrocław:
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.
Valcke, P., Pickard, R., & Sükösd, M. (2015). Media pluralism and diversity: concepts, risks and global
trends. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Voltmer, K. (2013). The Media in Transitional Democracies. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Dr. Beata Klimkiewicz is Associate Professor at the Institute of Journalism, Media and Social Commu-
nication at Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland
K
